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CUTTING COSTS AND CUTTING CORNERS-THE
SAFETY RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH OUTSOURCING
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND THE NEED FOR




W THIN THE PAST decade, United States air carriers have
exhibited an escalating partiality for outsourcing their
maintenance tasks to maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities
(repair stations).' Consequently, serious safety issues in the air-
line industry have emerged.2 Currently, United States air carri-
ers are outsourcing more than half of their maintenance to
repair stations in order to reduce costs and receive maintenance
services from specialists and experts. Several aircraft crashes
have already been caused by the sub-par maintenance being per-
formed at repair stations and inefficient oversight of those re-
* Kendal Van Wagner is a JD candidate for the class of 2008 at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
I See DAVID A. DOBBS, DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON THE AUDIT OF SAFETY OVER-
SIGHT OF AN AIR CARRIER INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 1-2 (2005). The 2005 data for
aviation safety oversight is the most recent data available for a full cumulative
year. An Accident Waiting to Happen? Outsourcing Raises Air-Safety Concerns, CON-
SUMER REPS., Mar. 2007, at 16 [hereinafter An Accident Waiting to Happen].
2 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1; see also ALEXIS M. STEFANI, DEP'T OF TRANsp.,
REVIEW OF AIR CARRIERS' USE OF AIRCRAFT REPAIR STATIONS 12 (2003).
3 See Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, Testi-
mony before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director of Physical
Infrastructure Issues, United States Government Accountability Office) [herein-
after Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges]; DOBBS,
supra note 1, at 1; Letter from Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't
of Transp., to The Honorable James L. Oberstar, Ranking Democratic Member,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (July 27, 2005) (on file
with author).
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pair stations by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) .4 As
a result, there is an extremely high level of speculation and fear
that such tragedies will only occur more frequently as the out-
sourcing trend in the airline industry becomes more popular
but the ability to oversee this trend becomes less feasible.5
Nonetheless, both air carriers and the FAA continue to inade-
quately supervise and regulate repair stations.6 What is most
alarming is that the FAA allows air carriers to use repair stations
that it has not certified, that have no formal limitations on the
scope of the maintenance that they perform, and that effectively
operate without regulatory oversight.7
This Comment will explore maintenance outsourcing within
the airline industry today, the adverse effect maintenance out-
sourcing is having on the United States' aviation industry's im-
maculate reputation for safety, what the FAA and air carriers are
doing to correct the problem, and more importantly, what they
should be doing to correct the problem.
Specifically, the second section of this Comment will provide
a brief overview defining outsourcing in a general sense of the
term. The third section of this paper will discuss outsourcing
within the airline industry, maintenance outsourcing in particu-
lar. It will explore the internal structure of the FAA and its re-
sponsibility for oversight of safety within the aviation industry. It
will also compare and contrast the two types of repair stations
that the FAA authorizes to perform maintenance for United
States air carriers, namely, those repair stations that are certifi-
cated and those that are not.
The fourth section of the paper will focus on the problems
currently arising out of maintenance outsourcing to certificated
repair stations. In particular, it will describe the details of a
highly publicized plane crash demonstrating the fatal conse-
quences of faulty maintenance work and poor oversight of cer-
tificated repair stations. It will then summarize the Department
of Transportation's 2003 and 2005 investigations into the FAA's
4 See Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 12; see also Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under
Examination, AIR SAFETY WK., Sept. 6, 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/
p/articles/mi-mOUBT/is _36_13/ai_55694275).
5 See Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 12.
6 See KENNETH M. MEAD, DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIR CARRIERS' USE OF NON-CERTIFI-
CATED REPAIR FACILITIES, 1, 3 (2005); DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1-4; see also STEFANI,
supra note 2, at 12-23.
7 See generally MEAD, supra note 6.
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oversight policies and regulation of certificated repair stations.
It will discuss the promises made by the FAA in response to the
Department of Transportation's constructive criticisms and how
those promises differed from the FAA's actual follow-through
behavior. Finally, it will discuss the FAA's most recent corrective
efforts to amend the statutory provision regulating repair sta-
tions as an attempt to solve its current oversight problems.
The fifth section of the paper will focus specifically on air car-
riers' and the FAA's lack of adequate oversight of non-certifi-
cated repair stations. Similar to the structure of the third
section analysis, this section will begin by describing in detail a
recent plane crash attributed to faulty maintenance performed
by a non-certificated repair station and the FAA's failure to
properly oversee the outsourcing that was being done. Then it
will provide an overview of the National Transportation Safety
Board's investigation into the accident and the Department of
Transportation's ensuing 2005 report on air carriers' use of
non-certificated repair stations. Finally, this section will discuss
the adverse effects of the FAA's failure to assume responsibility
for oversight of non-certificated repair stations.
The final section will argue that the FAA should assume re-
sponsibility for the downgrade in aviation safety as a result of
insufficiently-regulated repair stations. Moreover, this section
will recommend that the FAA expressly prohibit air carriers
from outsourcing any type of maintenance to non-certificated
repair stations. Consequently, air carriers will only be able to
use repair stations certified and regularly overseen by the FAA.
This will contain outsourced maintenance within one sector of
the aviation industry, thereby permitting the FAA's proposed
improvements to be implemented and efficient oversight to be
effectuated.
II. WHAT IS OUTSOURCING?
Outsourcing is the process by which one party hires a third
party to perform services that are traditionally done by in-house
employees.8 Outsourcing has been a common practice in many
industries, dating back to the 1970's. 9 Traditionally, outsourc-
8 Kim Newby, Feature: Outsourcing, At Home and Abroad, 21 ME. B.J. 74, 74
(2006).
9 Richard Johnstone, Claire Mayhew & Michael Quinlan, Outsourcing Risk? The
Regulation of Occupational Health and Safety Where Subcontractors are Employed, 22
COMP. LAB. L. & PoL''j. 351, 351 (2001).
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ing has been a way for companies to manage "excess work loads"
and has only been utilized in response to "seasonal or similar
trends."'" However, outsourcing has become increasingly preva-
lent over the past fifteen years in most industrialized countries
and across an array of industries." Large organizations are par-
ticularly fond of outsourcing as a way to "increase competitive-
ness/cut costs, bypass regulatory controls, and secure more
flexible employment arrangements."' 2  The third parties to
whom the work is outsourced are outfitted for the specific ser-
vices they offer and therefore can provide such services at lower
costs than the outsourcing company's own employees.13 Also,
the third party hired to do the outsourced work typically uses
"temporary and contingent employees, which reduces the size of
the labor force as well as the cost of the remaining workforce
[and thus] the price of conducting business."14 In sum, compa-
nies are increasingly exercising their preference for outsourcing
"peripheral activities"' 5 to heighten internal focus on their pri-
mary competencies. 6
Notwithstanding the economic and quality benefits, there are
also risks affiliated with outsourcing that are applicable to any
industry or business that uses outsourcing as a way to cut costs.'
7
Companies that make the choice to outsource must get to know
the company performing the outsourced work to determine
whether the outsourcee is "financially stable and has the ability
to perform the services [being] outsourced."' The most funda-
mental yet severe "downside of outsourcing" occurs when the
outsourcee is incapable of performing its assumed
responsibilities. 19
10 Carol A. Pisano, The Outsourcer's Apprentice: Employee or Illusion?, BRIEF, Sum-
mer 1997, at 13.
11 Johnstone, Mayhew & Quinlan, supra note 9, at 351.
12 Id.
13 Pisano, supra note 10, at 13.
14 Id.
15 Ann H. Spiotto & James E. Spiotto, The Ultimate Downside of Outsourcing:
Bankruptcy of the Service Provider, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 47, 47 (2003).
16 Newby, supra note 8, at 74.
17 See id. at 75; Spiotto & Spiotto, supra note 15, at 48.
is Spiotto & Spiotto, supra note 15, at 48.
19 Id.
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III. OUTSOURCING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Outsourcing aircraft maintenance is an accepted practice
within the aviation industry.20 The economic background of the
industry has dramatically changed over the past fifteen years, re-
sulting in a dramatic increase in the amount of outsourced air-
craft maintenance. 2' The United States' aviation industry
suffered a $35 billion loss between 2001 and 2005.22 Economic
pressure is weighing on the airline industry from an enfeebled
economy, bankruptcies, rising fuel costs, consumer expectations
for cheap airfares, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
and the resulting war in Iraq. 23 This dire economic background
has left United States air carriers scrambling to find ways to cut
their operating costs and keep the aviation industry afloat.24 For
example, the five air carriers which the Department of Trans-
portation had reviewed in their 2005 report,
retired 664 aircraft from September 2001 through December 31,
2004; stored 166 aircraft as of December 31, 2004; reduced their
personnel by 9,920 pilots and 12,873 mechanics from 2001
through 2003; closed forty-two maintenance facilities from 2001
through 2003; and established two low-cost airlines within their
own corporate structures.2 '
An industry-wide solution utilized to counteract the record fi-
nancial losses endured by many United States air carriers has
been to expand the amount of maintenance being outsourced
to repair stations.26 The kind of maintenance performed by re-
pair stations can range from menial tasks necessary to keep the
aircraft in operation on a day-to-day basis, to critical repairs in-
cluding the replacement of engines and flight control motors.27
20 See STEFANI, supra note 2, at 2.
21 See Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 12; MEAD, supra note 6, at 2; DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1; Differences of
Opinion Fail to Taint Benefits of Outsourcing, WoRLD AIRLINE NEWS, July 21, 2000,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi mOZCK/is_29_10/
ai_63644642/print.
22 An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17.
23 DOBBS, supra note 1, at viii, 1.
24 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Competition in Air Transport-The Need for a Shift in
Focus, 33 TRANSP. L.J. 29, 30-31 (2005-2006); see also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1.
25 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1-2.
26 Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra
note 4.
27 MEAD, supra note 6, at 5.
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Air carriers generally justify their increased utilization of re-
pair stations on two grounds.2  First, air carriers outsource
maintenance in order to reduce their overall costs of opera-
tion.29 Maintenance is generally the second largest cost in-
curred by an air carrier." By negotiating lower labor rates, air
carriers can potentially save thirty to forty percent of their main-
tenance costs by outsourcing to repair stations.' Second, air
carriers outsource maintenance in order to retain expert
mechanics that specialize in areas of repair work.32 Air carrier's
in-house facilities typically are neither staffed nor equipped for
maintenance requiring specialized expertise, thereby making it
much more expensive to handle such repair work internally. 33
The increased use of repair stations has been analyzed in vari-
ous investigative reports published by the Department of Trans-
portation.34 The Department of Transportation's research
revealed the following statistical trends. In 1996, even though
maintenance outsourcing was gaining momentum as a popular
trend in the aviation industry, United States air carriers still were
primarily using in-house mechanics certified by the FAA to
maintain their aircrafts and were only outsourcing thirty-seven
percent of their maintenance work. 5 By 2003, maintenance
outsourcing was much more commonplace, as major airlines
were collectively outsourcing forty-seven percent of their aircraft
maintenance. 6 Most recently, the United States Department of
Transportation reported in July of 2005 that air carriers are cur-
rently using repair stations more than ever before, contracting
out fifty-three percent of their aircraft maintenance tasks.3
The above statistics are intended to apply to the aviation in-
dustry as a whole; however, the amount of maintenance that is
outsourced to repair stations by a particular air carrier is not
fixed; rather, it is dependent on that air carrier's individual
28 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 8-9; Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Prac-
tices Under Examination, supra note 4.
29 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 8-9.
30 Differences of Opinion Fail to Taint Benefits of Outsourcing, supra note 21.
31 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 9.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See generally MEAD, supra note 6; DOBBS, supra note 1.
35 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1; STEFANI, supra note 2, at 1.
36 Letter from Kenneth M. Mead, supra note 3.
37 Id.
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needs.3" For example, Southwest Airlines outsources approxi-
mately fifty percent of its heavy duty maintenance and approxi-
mately ninety percent of its more minor maintenance such as
component repair.39 Southwest Airlines' director of heavy main-
tenance Tony Quillen described the airline's outsourcing policy
as a "natural division of labor,"4 ° allowing the airline to focus on
its expertise of carrying passengers and the repair stations to
utilize their expertise by performing maintenance repairs.41
Other air carriers that outsource a high percentage of their
maintenance costs include Alaska Air, America West and Jet
Blue.42
On the other hand, some airlines prefer to trust the majority
of their maintenance tasks, if not all of their maintenance tasks,
to their own in-house mechanics.4" For example, United Air-
lines performs practically all of its own maintenance work, in-
cluding heavy maintenance, outsourcing only twenty percent of
its repairs.44 Yvonne Daverin, quality assurance director for
United Airlines, cited "[United's] own core competencies ,].. .a
stable workforce and a greater inherent flexibility to respond to
demands" as the airline's primary reasons for performing the
majority of its maintenance internally.45 Other airlines that
have exhibited a preference for utilizing their in-house faculties
include Spirit, Frontier, and Delta Airlines.46
While it is recognized that the United States possesses and
maintains the safest aviation system in the world, there is an un-
deniable correlation between the rising levels of outsourced
38 See Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination,
supra note 4 (contrasting the amount of maintenance outsourced by Southwest
Airlines with the amount of maintenance outsourced by United Airlines).
39 Id.; STEFANI, supra note 2, at 9 (charting the percent of maintenance ex-
pense outsourced by several major air carriers and showing that Southwest out-
sourced sixty-four percent of its maintenance expenses in the year 2004).
40 Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra
note 4.
41 Id.
42 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 7, 9.




46 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 8. In the year 2004, Spirit outsourced thirty percent
of its maintenance expenses, Frontier outsourced thirty-three percent of its main-
tenance expenses, and Delta outsourced thirty-five percent of its maintenance
expenses. Id.
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maintenance and resulting aircraft accidents.47 As noted previ-
ously, airlines are currently outsourcing over half of their main-
tenance to repair stations.48 As maintenance outsourcing has
become more commonplace, so have instances of improper
maintenance.4" Between 1985 and 1996, poor maintenance was
a factor in one out of five major aircraft accidents. 50 More spe-
cifically, between 1992 and 1996, reports of inadequate quality
materialized into four aircraft accidents caused by improper
maintenance performed at repair stations. 5' In 2005, the In-
spector General characterized the number of general aviation
accidents as simply "still too high," adding up to 1,614 general
aviation accidents resulting in 556 fatalities.52 Most recently, the
Government Accountability Office reported in 2006 that the
FAA will not meet its 2006 performance target for commercial
air carrier safety as a result of four fatal crashes in fiscal year
2006. 5  It is clear that such efforts by United States air carriers
to be financially savvy are taking their toll on the value of safety
in the aviation industry.54
IV. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND
REPAIR STATIONS
The FAA is the agency ultimately responsible for ensuring
that economic changes affecting the airline industry as a whole
do not adversely affect the level of safety provided to the civilian
flyer. Additionally, the FAA is responsible for ensuring that
repair stations operate in a manner that is in compliance with
47 See Aviation Safety-Observations on FAA's Oversight and Changes in the Airline
Industry, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., Subcommittee on Aviation, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Ken-
neth M. Mead, Inspector General, Department of Transportation) [hereinafter
Observations on FAA's Oversight and Changes in the Airline Industry]; see also Oversight
of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra note 4.
48 Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 12.
49 Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra
note 4.
50 Id.
51 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 1.
52 See Observations on FAA's Oversight and Changes in the Airline Industry, supra
note 47, at 1.
53 Aviation Safety: FAA 's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 6.
54 Abeyratne, supra note 24, at 31.
55 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 3.
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the FAA's safety standards. 6 The FAA expressly authorizes air
carriers to outsource their maintenance to two types of repair
stations. The first type of repair station which can perform
maintenance work outsourced by air carriers is called a certifi-
cated repair station.58 Certificated repair stations are contract
repair facilities that have been certified by the FAA under Title
14 Part 145 of the Code of Federal Regulations.59 In order to be
a certificated repair station, the facility must submit an applica-
tion to the FAA containing a repair station manual, a quality
control manual, the proposed scope of the repair station, the
names and titles of supervisory personnel, a description of hous-
ing and facilities, a physical address, whether the repair station
intends on hiring contract workers, and a training program.60
Currently, there are over 5,200 certificated repair stations that
perform maintenance on United States aircraft.6
The FAA not only requires a rigorous approval process for a
repair station to become certificated, but additionally, it has an
oversight system in place that requires continual evaluation of
all certificated repair stations in order to verify that they have
the staff and equipment needed to complete the type of mainte-
nance work the facility is authorized to perform.62 The FAA em-
ploys approximately 3,300 safety inspectors who provide
worldwide oversight to 5,250 certificated repair stations; 139
commercial air carriers; 273,000 aircraft mechanics; 7,600 com-
mercial aircraft; 11,000 charter aircraft; 220,000 general aviation
aircraft; and 700 aviation training facilities.63 More specifically,
the FAA staffs two kinds of safety inspectors: Flight Standards
District Office inspectors and Certificate Management Office in-
56 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 2.
57 See MEAD, supra note 6, at 10.
58 See id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 145.1 (2007).
59 Oversight of Maintenance and Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra
note 4. Note that this article refers to repair stations as third-party repair facilities
and that the two terms are interchangeable for purposes of this comment.
60 14 C.F.R. § 145.51(a)(1)-(7) (2007). Mechanics who are certified by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must have graduated from a certified avi-
ation maintenance technical school; they must pass a written test on the construc-
tion and maintenance of aircraft, the federal regulations, and provisions
governing mechanics; and they must pass an oral and a practical skills test. In-
demnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, 344 F.3d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.71, 65.75, 65.77, 65.79).
61 Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 5; STEFANI, supra note 2, at 1.
62 MEAD, supra note 6, at 3, 4.
63 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 1.
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spectors. 64 The primary responsibility of the district office in-
spectors is to conduct surveillance at certificated repair stations;
the certificate management inspectors are assigned to one spe-
cific air carrier and may inspect the certificated repair stations
which perform significant work for that assigned air carrier.65
The second type of repair station expressly authorized by the
FAA to perform outsourced maintenance is a non-certificated
repair station. 66 Outsourcing maintenance to non-certificated
repair stations historically has been an accepted and cost-effec-
tive way for air carriers to keep their maintenance costs to a min-
imum." The key differences between certificated and non-
certificated facilities are the applicable FAA operating require-
ments and restrictions.6" While the FAA requires certificated re-
pair stations to have quality control systems, designated
supervisors, inspectors, and training programs; non-certificated
repair stations must only be staffed with one certified mechanic,
are not bound by FAA operating requirements, and are not re-
quired to have a facility in which to operate.6' Furthermore, the
FAA does not track the amount or type of work non-certificated
facilities perform and does not maintain information on where
these facilities are located.v The sole requirement imposed on
non-certificated repair stations by the FAA is that a mechanic
certified by the FAA signs off on the repairs upon their
completion.71
The FAA's approval of non-certificated repair stations is pre-
mised on the unwritten assumption that the non-certificated re-
pair stations are performing only minor maintenance tasks and
any repair exceeding minor maintenance is only permissible in
emergency situations. 72 However, a 2005 investigation by the
Department of Transportation showed that non-certificated re-
pair stations were performing on-call maintenance, scheduled
64 Id. at 2. In addition to using human inspectors for oversight purposes, the
FAA also uses an electronic surveillance system, dubbed Air Transportation Over-
sight System (ATOS). An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17. The
significance of ATOS will be discussed in further detail in the context of the
FAA's failure to effectively oversee certificated repair stations.
65 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 2.
66 MEAD, supra note 6, at 1-2.
67 Id. at 1.
68 Id. at 4.
69 Id. at 4, 11.
70 Id. at 6.
71 Id. at 1-2.
72 Id. at 1.
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maintenance and critical aircraft repairs on a regular basis.73
Therefore, critical aircraft maintenance is being performed by
outsourcees that are neither certified nor routinely reviewed
and that lack any limitations on the scope of maintenance that
they may perform. 4 Only the contract between the air carrier
and the non-certificated repair station defines the work the re-
pair station is hired to do, and more often than not, the con-
tracts are "open-ended" and the scope of the repair station's
authority is contained in "broad language" such as "as
needed.7
5
V. PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINSTRATION OVERSIGHT OF CERTIFICATED
REPAIR STATIONS
A. THE VALUJET TRAGEDY
Despite the increased amount of maintenance outsourcing
among United States air carriers, the FAA has not responded in
step with a sufficient shift in oversight of repair stations.76 In the
context of certificated repair stations, this deficiency was first
brought to light in 1996 when Valujet Flight 592 crashed into
the Florida Everglades, killing all 110 passengers aboard the
aircraft.77
Valujet had been experiencing a wide range of maintenance
complications for several years before the infamous crash oc-
curred.78 Two years before the crash, Valujet had reported fif-
teen emergency landings; in the following year, that number
increased to fifty-seven.79 In the four months prior to the crash,
Valujet was averaging one unscheduled landing every other
day."' Emergency landings were not Valujet's only problems.8 "
Other complications included landing gear malfunctions,
73 Id. at 5.
74 Id. at 12.
75 Id.
76 DOBBS, supra note 1, at ii; Letter from Kenneth M. Mead, supra note 3;
STEFANI, supra note 2, at xx-xxi.
77 United States v. SabreTech, 271 F.3d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001); Lea Ann
Carlisle, Comment, The FAA v. The NTSB: Now that Congress has Addressed the Federal
Aviation Administration's "Dual Mandate," Has the FAA Begun Living up to its
Amended Purpose of Making Air Travel Safer, or is the National Transportation Safety
Board Doing its Job Alone?, 66J. AIR L. & CoM. 741, 752-54 (2001).
78 Carlisle, supra note 77, at 752.
79 Id. at 793.
80 Id. at 753.
81 See id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
smoke and fumes infiltrating into the cabin air, engine explo-
sions, shorted out microphones inhibiting pilot communication
with Air Traffic Control, sudden cabin depressurization, and the
use of duct tape to fix "problem spots. '8 2 In 1996, just before
the crash, the FAA's inspectors filed a report on ValuJet's
problems.83 Despite the horrific nature of the safety issues de-
scribed by the inspectors, the FAA took disproportionate ac-
tion."4 Not only did the FAA refuse to ground the airline, giving
Valujet a mere warning, but it continually represented to the
public that Valujet was not having any problems.8 5
SabreTech was the certificated repair station hired by Valujet
to do "repair[s], modification[s] and maintenance" that
Valuejet had decided to outsource rather than perform inter-
nally.8 6 In January 1996, ValuJet delivered three used aircrafts
to SabreTech for "major modification and maintenance" with
the ultimate goal of incorporating these aircraft into the Valujet
fleet.8 7 During the renovation of these three planes, SabreTech
mechanics executed orders to replace old oxygen generators
with new ones subject to the warning that if the old oxygen gen-
erators were not emptied, they would generate extremely high
temperatures. 8 However, the SabreTech mechanics did not
empty the old generators.8 9 Instead, the old oxygen generators
were removed and then packed into boxes and described on a
shipping slip as "Oxy Canisters Empty."90 Tragically, the out-
dated and unemptied oxygen canisters were loaded by
SabreTech employees onto Valujet Flight 592 and shortly after
take off, a fire erupted on the plane causing the aircraft to crash
into the Florida Everglades, resulting in the death of all 110
passengers. 91
Immediately after the Valujet tragedy, the FAA began con-
ducting daily inspections, publicly admitted that there were seri-
ous problems with the airline warranting its shut-down, and
assumed at least some responsibility for the faulty maintenance
82 Id.
83 Id. at 754.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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performed at the repair station. Three years later, a federal
indictment was issued for three SabreTech employees on
charges of conspiracy, making false statements and mislabeling
and mishandling hazardous materials.93 Although the charges
against the individual mechanics were eventually dismissed,
SabreTech was convicted of "willfully failing to train its employ-
ees."94 While the National Transportation Safety Board did as-
sign blame to the FAA and Valujet in its report for inadequate
oversight of the work being performed by SabreTech, no
charges were filed against either entity.95
B. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S EMPTY PROMISES
AFTER VALUJET
Over the past several years, the FAA has repeatedly assured
the Department of Transportation and the American public that
they have created a system for overseeing certificated repair sta-
tions.96 Despite the Department of Transportation's continued
demand for change and the FAA's promises to enhance its over-
sight of repair stations, it has yet to implement a system of effec-
tive oversight.97
Going back to 2003, partially in response to the Valujet trag-
edy, the Department of Transportation issued a report calling
for immediate improvement in the FAA's oversight of certifi-
cated repair stations as a result of the increasing level of work
certificated repair stations were doing on United States air-
craft.98 The Department of Transportation expressed concern
that while the aviation industry was quickly shifting a large por-
tion of its maintenance work to certificated repair stations, the
FAA's oversight of aircraft maintenance was still focused on the
work performed in air carriers' in-house facilities. 99 The FAA's
oversight shortcomings had resulted in problems such as repair
stations' improper use of parts as specified in maintenance
92 Carlisle, supra note 77, at 754.
93 SabreTech, Inc., 271 F.3d at 1020-21.
94 Id.
95 Carlisle, supra note 77, at 774. Note that the National Transportation Board
is not an eligible agency to enforce against inadequate safety oversight. Id. at
746. While the National Transportation Board is responsible for investigating air
disasters, it does not have the statutory authority to enforce the recommenda-
tions it makes to the FAA. Id.
96 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1; STEFAN[, supra note 2, at 9.
97 Letter from Kenneth M. Mead, supra note 3.
98 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1; STEFANI, supra note 2, at 7.
99 STEFANI, supra note 2, at xx-xxi, 12-23.
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manuals; improper calibration of tools and equipment used for
repairs; a lack of records attesting to mechanics' training and
qualifications; and failure to correct inadequacies already identi-
fied by FAA inspectors.1 0 The Department of Transportation
recommended at the conclusion of its 2003 report that the FAA
develop ways to determine which repair stations air carriers were
using for their most critical repairs; perform risk assessments or
analysis of data collected on air carrier outsourcing practices;
and develop a comprehensive, standardized approach to repair
station surveillance.' The FAA was amenable to all of the
aforementioned recommendations and assured the Department
of Transportation that the corrections would be imple-
mented.10 2
In 2005, the Department of Transportation issued yet another
report pertaining to the FAA's oversight of maintenance being
outsourced to, and performed by, certificated repair stations.10 3
Again, the Department of Transportation expressed the same
concerns it had two years prior.'0 4 Despite some progress to-
ward a "more risk-based approach to safety oversight," the De-
partment of Transportation still was not satisfied with the FAA's
oversight as a sufficient response to rapidly occurring changes
within the aviation industry.10 5 In particular, the report criti-
cized the FAA for not yet establishing "processes used by inspec-
tors to identify risks in air carriers' systems, prioritize their
inspections, and shift their inspections to areas of greater
risks."' '° The FAA had promised to implement similar processes
in 2003, and again, was making the same promises after the De-
partment of Transportation made the aforementioned
findings. 0 7
One specific measure that was taken by the FAA to draw in-
spectors' somewhat immediate attention to repair station over-
sight was to initiate a "special emphasis program" requiring FAA
inspectors to analyze how well air carriers monitored the work
performed by the certificated repair stations with whom they
100 Id. at xiv.
101 Id. at 2.
102 Id. at 33-34.
103 See generally DOBBS, supra note 1.
104 See generally id.; STEFANI, supra note 2.
105 DOBBS, supra note 1, at ii.
106 Id. at 1.
107 Id.
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contracted. 0 8 However, the inspectors have not and are not ex-
ecuting their jobs effectively.0 9 District office inspectors man-
age colossal workloads and can typically only complete "full
facility inspections at certificated repair stations once or twice a
year." ' 0 The certificate management inspectors make infre-
quent visits to the certificated repair stations performing the
maintenance work for the particular air carrier which they have
been assigned to oversee, and do not draft any sort of written
review of the certificated repair stations' operations.II Overall,
FAA inspectors did not complete twenty-six percent of their in-
spections in 2005, even though airlines were outsourcing more
maintenance than ever before." 12
Moreover, the Department of Transportation reported in
2005 that the availability of FAA inspection personnel is only ex-
pected to decrease."' In 2005, the Department of Transporta-
tion predicted a loss of 300 aviation safety inspectors, 233 of
those coming from the FAA Flight Standards District Office."'
Additionally, the FAA is gradually moving toward an electronic-
surveillance system called the Air Transportation Oversight Sys-
tem, also known as ATOS.'15 ATOS relies on statistical analysis
and reporting by the airlines themselves rather than inspections
physically conducted by FAA staff. 1 6 However, the Department
of Transportation has asserted that such corrective efforts are
not going to be sufficient "to ensure that all high risk and
emerging issues receive adequate coverage."'1 17
The Department of Transportation is not the only govern-
mental entity that is unsatisfied with the FAA's safety oversight
of certificated repair stations. On September 20, 2006, the
United States Government Accountability Office released a re-
108 Letter from Kenneth M. Mead, supra note 3.
109 Id.; STEFANI, supra note 2, at 12.
110 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 12. For example, one district office inspector was
assigned thirty-two agricultural operations, nineteen repair stations, seven on-de-
mand operators, two helicopter operators and one maintenance school. Id. at
16.
III Id. at 12.
112 Observations on FAA 's Oversight and Changes in the Airline Industry, supra note
47, at 4.
113 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 3.
114 Id.
115 An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17.
116 Id. Despite the FAA's increasing reliance on ATOS, it still plans on utilizing
physical inspections as evidenced by the its funding request for eighty new Flight
Standards inspectors during the fiscal year of 2006. DoBBs, supra note 1, at 3.
117 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 3.
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port characterizing the FAA's safety oversight efforts as "gener-
ally strong but [still] fac[ing] challenges." '18 The report asserts
that the FAA inspectors are not being efficiently utilized, such
that their responsibilities mostly center on non-risk based activi-
ties.119 Additionally, the report expressed concern that the FAA
is not adequately supervising individuals and organizations
which it authorizes to oversee certificated repair stations on its
behalf.12 ° Because these "designees" conduct approximately
ninety percent of safety certification-related activities on behalf
of the FAA, the report urges that they be effectively managed so
as to ensure the safety of the aviation industry and compliance
with the FAA's policies. 12' Finally, the Government Accountabil-
ity Office finds enforcement of the FAA's rules to be unclear
and lenient, such that there exists minimal incentive to comply
with safety regulations. 1
22
C. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S MOST RECENT
CORRECTIVE EFFORT
Since the Department of Transportation and the Government
Accountability Office issued their unflattering reports on the
status of the FAA's oversight efforts, the FAA has released a long-
awaited Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to revamp the stan-
dards imposed upon certificated repair stations by Title 14 Sec-
tion 145 of the Code of Federal Regulations and hopefully
depart from its history of inefficient oversight. 123 One of the
primary ways the FAA proposes to improve the quality of mainte-
nance work being performed by certificated repair stations is to
require internal evaluation programs. 124 Rather than merely re-
quiring an evaluation of the final product, the FAA proposes to
mandate "internal evaluations of operations and establish a
118 See generally Aviation Safety: FAA 's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Chal-
lenges, supra note 61.
119 Id. at 1.
120 Id. at 4-5. Through these "designee" programs, the FAA employs 13,400
persons and 218 organizations to perform safety certification activities, including
the oversight of certificated repair stations. Id. at 5.
121 Id. at 11.
122 Id. at 12.
121 14 C.F.R § 145 (2007); Department of Transportation and Repair Stations,
71 Fed. Reg. 70,254, 70,254-56 (Dec. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 145 C.F.R.
§ 145); Aeronautical Repair Station Ass'n, FAA Releases Proposed Rules for Re-
pair Stations, http://www.arsa.org/node/375 (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
124 Department of Transportation and Repair Stations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 70,264.
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management review and follow up system."' 125 Moreover, the
FAA explains that there is no rigid framework for internal evalu-
ation systems and that air carriers may tailor the program to
meet their particular needs. 126 Other proposed amendments to
the current oversight system include requiring a certificated re-
pair station to designate a chief inspector, possess permanent
housing, meet expanded quality system requirements, and
maintain a capabilities list. 127 The FAA has averred that these
proposed amendments will be an effective way to identify defi-
ciencies in operations, promptly correct the problems, and
quickly generate plans for improvement. 28
VI. PROBLEMS WITH OVERSIGHT OF NON-
CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS
A. THE 2003 AIjMIDwEST CRASH
Although the Department of Transportation had devoted al-
most all of its attention prior to 2003 to the FAA's ineffective
oversight of certificated repair stations, it recently became
acutely aware of an emerging oversight issue for which it de-
manded the FAA's immediate attention.1 21 On January 8, 2003,
a fatal plane crash occurred in North Carolina. 130 The plane
was an Air Midwest twin-turboprop.' 3 1 Shortly after it departed
from Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, the pilot called
air traffic control to issue an emergency distress alert.1 3 2 Sud-
denly, the airplane "pitched upward from seven degrees nose up
to fifty-two degrees, veered left, turned over" and headed
straight for a United States Airways maintenance hangar. 3 3 The
plane crashed, killing all twenty-one people aboard the plane
12-5 Id. at 70,264.
126 Id. at 70,265.
127 Id. at 70,263-66.
128 Id. at 70,264.
129 MEAD, supra note 6, at 1.
13o Poor Maintenance Cited as Primary Cause of Air Midwest Crash, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Mar. 1, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mOUBT/is-9_18/
ai_113773896/print.
131 Id.
132 Gregory Polek, Air Midwest Crash Ushers in Regionals'Day of Disaster, AIN ON-
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and injuring a bystander on the ground. 13 4 The impact of the
crash structurally annihilated the plane and a post-crash fire cre-
mated both the aircraft and the passengers' bodies. 35
After investigating the crash, the National Transportation
Safety Board discovered that the maintenance on the plane had
been double-outsourced. 136 Air Midwest had contracted their
maintenance to be performed by a non-certificated repair sta-
tion called Raytheon Aerospace. 3 ' Raytheon Aerospace then
hired mechanics from another company called Structural Modi-
fication and Repair Technicians (hereinafter SMART) to work
on the Air Midwest aircrafts."3 s The most extensively-trained
mechanic that was provided by SMART to Raytheon Aerospace
had been with the company for a mere two months. 3 9 As for
the other five mechanics who had been working on the aircraft,
the National Transportation Safety Board characterized them as
having "virtually zero experience. '' 1 0
After its investigation, the National Transportation Safety
Board determined that the accident had been caused by an im-
properly-serviced airfoil, faulty rigging of the elevator control
system and the fact that the plane was almost 600 pounds over-
weight before take off.1 41 All these complications resulted from
inadequate maintenance performed at Raytheon Aerospace.142
Additionally, the National Transportation Safety Board reported
that other problems contributing to the crash included:
Air Midwest's lack of oversight of the work being performed at
[its] maintenance station, Air Midwest's maintenance procedures
and documentation . . . the Raytheon Aerospace quality assur-
ance inspector's failure to detect the incorrect rigging of the ele-
vator control system . . . [and] the Federal Aviation
Administration's lack of oversight of Air Midwest's maintenance
program and its weight and balance program.1 43
134 Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Loss of Pitch Control Caused Fatal
Airliner Crash in Charlotte, North Carolina Last Year (Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter NTSB Press Release].
135 Id.; Polek, supra note 132.




140 Poor Maintenance Cited as Primary Cause of Air Midwest Crash, supra note 130.
141 An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17; Poor Maintenance Cited as
Primary Cause of Air Midwest Crash, supra note 130.
142 NTSB Press Release, supra note 134.
143 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-04/01, Loss OF PITCH CONTROL
DURING TAKEOFF AR MIDWEST FLIGHT 541 RAYTHEON (BEECHcRAFT) 1900 D,
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Upon the release of its investigative findings, the National
Transportation Safety Board expressed its opinion that what
needed to come out of this calamity was the recognition of "how
important it is for everyone involved in the safety chain to do
their jobs properly."' 44
B. THE 2005 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPORT ON
NON-CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS
The Air Midwest accident prompted the Department of
Transportation to depart from their traditional approach to in-
vestigating the FAA's oversight efforts. 4 5 Historically, the De-
partment of Transportation conducted investigations into the
effectiveness of FAA oversight of certificated repair stations. 46
However, the 2003 Air Midwest crash shed light on non-certifi-
cated repair stations as an increasingly popular resource for air
carriers to obtain inexpensive maintenance services without re-
strictions, regulation, or review. 147 Thus, the Department of In-
vestigation launched an investigation into non-certificated
repair stations with three primary objectives:
(1) to determine the reasons and extent to which air carriers use
non-certificated repair facilities to complete their aircraft mainte-
nance work;
(2) how FAA requirements for non-certificated facilities differ
from those for certificated repair stations; and
(3) how the FAA identifies and monitors work performed at
noncertificated repair facilities and ensures that air carriers are
providing effective oversight of this work. 4 8
Before delving into its investigation, the Department of Trans-
portation asked the FAA about its knowledge of the kind of
maintenance non-certificated repair stations were perform-
ing.149 The FAA informed the Department of Transportation
that non-certificated repair stations "only performed minor ser-
vices." 150 However, the investigation uncovered much more
N233YV CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA JANUARY 8, 2003 x (2004), available at
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0401.pdf, NTSB Press Release, supra
note 134.
144 NTSB Press Release, supra note 134.
145 See generally MEAD, supra note 6.
146 Id. at 2; see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1.
147 MEAD, supra note 6, at 1.
148 Id. at 1-2.
149 id. at 3.
150 id. at 2.
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work being performed at non-certificated repair facilities than
merely minor maintenance tasks.' 5' The Department of Trans-
portation determined that 1,400 non-certificated repair stations
were routinely performing scheduled maintenance tasks and
critical aircraft repairs. 5 2 Scheduled maintenance that non-cer-
tificated repair stations are performing includes:
detailed interior and exterior checks that verify the airworthiness
of the aircraft; daily checks to evaluate wings, engine, landing
gear, and flight control systems for damage; inspections of crew
and passenger oxygen, aircraft fuselage, wings, and engines for
discrepancies at prescribed time intervals; and repairs to hydrau-
lic valves required by Federal Aviation Administration Airworthi-
ness Directives.15
3
Critical aircraft repairs that are being performed by non-certifi-
cated repair stations include, for example, "removing and re-
placing engines, replacing flight control motors, and removing
and replacing aircraft doors.' 54 Additionally, the investigation
uncovered "improper maintenance procedures, overlooked
maintenance discrepancies, and incorrect logbook entries.
1 55
The FAA informed the Department of Transportation that be-
cause the air carriers hire these non-certificated repair stations,
they are responsible for adequately training and evaluating the
work completed by the on-site mechanics. 156 However, the De-
partment of Transportation's inspection of the air carriers'
training programs showed that such programs are inade-
quate.157 Examples of inadequate training provided by air carri-
ers to mechanics at non-certificated repair stations include less
than one hour of video training, one and a half hours of class-
room training, and handing out a maintenance procedure work-
book to be completed, signed and returned by fax.'
58
As a result of insufficient training, the Department of Trans-
portation found numerous instances of improper documenta-
tion of the maintenance performed by mechanics at various
non-certificated repair stations. 59 When maintenance tasks are
151 Id. at 1, 3, 5.
152 Id. at 6.
153 Id.
154 MEAD, supra note 6, at 6.
155 Id. at 12.
156 Id. at 17.
157 Id. at 18.
158 Id.
159 Id.
2007] OUTSOURCING AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 651
not recorded in the logbooks accurately, there is a serious risk of
compromising aviation safety and maintenance error-preven-
tion. 16 ° For instance, one mechanic misrepresented in the re-
pair station's logbook that a repair had been completed when
actually it had been deferred. 6 ' As a result, the pilot was unable
to determine that the aircraft had a malfunctioning aircraft con-
trol system. 162
At the conclusion of its investigation, the Department of
Transportation made several recommendations to the FAA in
order to improve their oversight of non-certificated repair sta-
tions and thus the quality of work being performed by the non-
certificated repair stations.1 63 The Department of Transporta-
tion recommended that the FAA immediately:
Identify which non-certificated facilities perform critical mainte-
nance functions and scheduled maintenance tasks; determine
whether it should limit the type of work non-certificated facilities
can perform; expand its maintenance oversight program to in-
clude non-certificated repair facilities if it determines that no
limitations should be placed on the type or scope of work these
facilities can perform; [routinely] evaluate air carrier training
and oversight programs to determine whether carriers have ef-
fective systems in place to ensure work performed by non-certifi-
cated facilities is completed in accordance with air carrier and
Federal Aviation Administration requirements; and determine
whether air carriers evaluate background, experience, and quali-
fications of temporary maintenance personnel. 6 4
Upon presenting these suggestions to the FAA on November
18, 2005, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
and the Director of Flight Standards agreed with the Depart-
ment of Transportation that such recommendations were both
reasonable and achievable. 6 5 However, one month later, the
FAA came out with a contradictory position when it issued a
written response that candidly disagreed with the Department of
Transportation's recommendations.166 The FAA provided mul-
tiple excuses and justifications for the current lack of supervi-
sion over non-certificated repair stations. 67 The FAA asserted
160 Id.
161 Id. at 19.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 8.
164 Id. at 8, 22-23.
165 Id. at 8, 23.
166 Id. at 8-9.
167 Id. at 29.
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that the Department of Transportation failed to make clear in
its report that non-certificated repair stations are required to
staff at least one certificated mechanic to perform maintenance
work at these facilities. 16 The letter emphasized that the certifi-
cated mechanics are well-trained pursuant to the FAA's stan-
dards and are ultimately responsible for ensuring that the
aircraft are undergoing proper maintenance at non-certificated
facilities. 169 The FAA also assured the Department of Transpor-
tation that using certificated mechanics has traditionally pro-
vided a sufficient level of safety oversight.1
71
C. THE ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABSENCE OF SAFETY
OVERSIGHT AT NON-CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS
Despite the numerous reports through which the Department
of Transportation has repeatedly expressed its concern with in-
adequate FAA and air carrier oversight of outsourced mainte-
nance to non-certificated repair stations, neither party has felt
compelled to take sufficient steps to remedy this safety con-
cern. 171 The FAA openly refuses to accept any responsibility for
the oversight of non-certificated repair stations based on the
reasoning that such facilities have not been certificated by it,
and therefore are not within its regulatory jurisdiction. 72 The
FAA views non-certificated repair stations as "extensions of the
air carrier's maintenance program" and therefore relies on the
air carriers to provide those mechanics with adequate training
and oversight.173 The FAA insists that requiring a certificated
mechanic at every non-certificated repair station is more than a
sufficient effort on its part to ensure quality maintenance work
is performed on United States aircraft. 174 However, as clearly
demonstrated by the Air Midwest Crash in 2003 and then the
Department of Transportation's 2005 Report on Non-Certifi-
cated Repair Stations, the quality assurance provided by one cer-
tified mechanic's approval is wholly inadequate. 175 Nonetheless,
according to the FAA, it is the air carrier that is supposed to
-6 See id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 30.
171 Id. at 3.
172 Id. at 17.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 29-30.
175 Id. at 17.
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monitor the facility it hires, and that is the end of its responsibil-
ity in the oversight of non-certificated repair stations. 76
Despite the FAA's stance that air carriers should be held ac-
countable for the oversight of non-certificated repair stations,
air carriers cannot be entrusted with this responsibility because
it would be economically disadvantageous for air carriers to reg-
ulate their least expensive source of maintenance labor. If the
air carriers take appropriate regulatory measures by imposing
quality control programs and requiring more extensive
mechanic training, operating costs will rise. 177 Because the FAA
has abdicated all responsibility to the air carriers, there is no
enforcement mechanism to ensure that regulations are being
imposed by the air carriers. Without enforcement, air carriers
will continue to adapt to their rapidly changing economic status
and an increasingly competitive market, they will continue to
outsource to non-certificated repair stations, and they will never
challenge the operations and procedures that make non-certifi-
cated repair stations the most economical way to manage repair
work. 17 ' But according to the FAA, this complete and utter lack
of authority over non-certificated repair stations is just not their
problem. '79
Because the FAA refuses to regulate non-certificated repair
stations, which it authorizes to exist, and because air carriers are
not in any hurry to incur increased maintenance costs by in-
creasing safety standards, non-certificated repair stations are ef-
fectively subject to no rules or restrictions. As a result, a "double
standard" exists in the regulatory criteria applicable to the main-
tenance being performed at both certificated and non-certifi-
cated facilities.8 ° The FAA, via its imposition of multiple rules
and regulations at certificated repair stations, clearly recognizes
that effective safety oversight is necessary at those facilities that
have traditionally performed air carriers' critical maintenance
176 Id. at 3-4.
177 See Department of Transportation and Repair Stations, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,254,
70,268 (Dec. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 145). In its proposed
amended version of Title 14 Section 145 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the
FAA articulates the costs of implementing the new and improved regulations to
govern certificated repair stations, namely $136.6 million to the repair station
industry and $8.2 million to the FAA. Id. The proper inference from this data is
that higher standards mean higher costs, a principle that is applicable in a wide
variety of contexts.
178 Abeyratne, supra note 24, at 29-30.
179 See MFAD, supra note 6, at 17.
so Id. at 6, 24.
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tasks. ' At certificated repair stations, the FAA's use of certifi-
cated mechanics "is only the first level of quality control"'8 2 and
is subsequently followed by "multiple levels of oversight."'8 3 In
contrast, non-certificated repair stations are currently perform-
ing equally as critical maintenance work as certificated repair
stations and yet are subject to none of the FAA's directives.8 4
Nonetheless, the FAA insists that imposing similar rules and reg-
ulations on non-certificated repair stations is neither their place
nor their obligation. Thus, the double standard is established -
critical maintenance requires oversight, and at the same time, it
requires no oversight. 185
Historically operating under the assumption that non-certifi-
cated repair stations were only performing minor maintenance
tasks, the FAA was once able to rationalize anything more than
minimal oversight was simply excessive for such menial work.'86
But now, the FAA has been given concrete statistical data by the
Department of Transportation indicating that non-certificated
repair stations are performing maintenance that is equally as
critical as that performed by certificated repair stations.'87 The
FAA is allowing non-certificated repair stations to perform this
critical work without rules, regulations, or a watchful eye.' 88 As
the oversight agency responsible for aviation safety in the
United States, the FAA is failing to recognize that "the transition
to increased use of outside repair facilities is not the issue-it is
that maintenance, wherever it is done, requires oversight." '189
D. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION LACKS THE
NECESSARY RESOURCES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY OF
SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF NON-CERTIFICATED
REPAIR STATIONS
In response to the increasingly critical maintenance being
performed by non-certificated repair stations, the Department
of Transportation has called for the FAA to assume the responsi-
181 See generally 71 Fed. Reg. 70,254; DOBBS, supra note 1; STEFANI, supra note 2.
182 MEAD, supra note 6, at 23-24.
183 Id. at 24.
184 Id. at 6.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 4.
187 See generally id.
188 Id. at 3.
189 Observations on FAA's Oversight and Changes in the Airline Industry, supra note
47, at 5.
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bility of overseeing this recently discovered sector of the aviation
industry. However, the FAA simply does not have the resources
to adequately oversee non-certificated repair stations. As dis-
cussed previously, the FAA's staffing and financial resources are
already strained such that it struggles to effectively oversee cer-
tificated repair stations."' The desire for effective oversight is
not idle within the FAA, as evidenced by the December 2006
release of their proposed regulatory changes for the oversight of
certificated repair stations and their transition into an efficient
electronic oversight system.'91 Rather, the FAA's resources
render it incapable of executing the much-needed transforma-
tion in its current oversight policy for certificated repair
stations.
Already operating with limited resources, the FAA cannot pos-
sibly provide adequate oversight to non-certificated repair sta-
tions. The past several years have revealed an entirely
unregulated sector of the aviation industry by showcasing the
FAA's nonexistent oversight efforts with non-certificated repair
stations. 9 2 Therefore, the case made by the FAA for its refusal
to assume responsibility for non-certificated repair stations is
moot because even if it wanted to, the FAA is neither adequately
funded nor staffed to expand its oversight efforts into this new
and substantially large sector of the aviation industry.193 It is
nothing short of dangerous for the Department of Transporta-
tion to add insult to injury by recommending that the FAA as-
sume the responsibility of overseeing and regulating more than
1,400 non-certificated repair stations'94 in addition to the 5,200
certificated repair stations that it already struggles to manage. 95
190 See Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 1.
19, See generally Department of Transportation and Repair Stations, 71 Fed.
Reg. 70,254 (Dec. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 145); see also An Accident
Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17.
192 MEAl, supra note 6, at 1.
193 Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges, supra
note 3, at 1; see also DOBBS, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also STEFANI, supra note 2, at
12.
194 MEAD, supra note 6, at 1.
195 STEFANI, supra note 2, at 1.
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VII. THE SOLUTION: THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD NOT PERMIT AIRLINES TO
OUTSOURCE THEIR MAINTENANCE TO NON-
CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATIONS
The major problem that can and must be remedied by the
FAA is the critical maintenance being performed in an unsafe
manner by non-certificated repair stations as a result of inade-
quate oversight. Engine swaps and repairs to hydraulic valves
are critical maintenance tasks requiring critical preparation and
critical oversight at multiple stages of the process. 9 6 The FAA
has recognized this by requiring multi-tiered oversight at the fa-
cilities it assumes exclusively perform this level of repairs. It is
true, especially against a background of economic distress, that
"for every proposed safety regulation, the [FAA] must weigh the
cost of implementation and determine if it is worth the financial
strain on the airlines. ' 19 7 However, at no point should the
agency in charge of the "safest aviation industry in the world" be
willing to loosen its regulatory reigns and risk the lives of air-
borne consumers in order to ensure that airlines are saving
every penny they can get in their bank account.'9 8
While the FAA must not continue its tradition of ignoring
strong recommendations for change, it should not follow the
Department of Transportation's recommendation of assuming
responsibility for the oversight of all non-certificated repair sta-
tions. Rather than further strain its already limited resources
and lessen the overall quality of aviation safety oversight, the
FAA should propose an amendment to Chapter 14 Section 145
of the Code of Federal Regulations that expressly disallows out-
sourcing maintenance to non-certificated repair stations.
This amendment will have several significant effects. By
prohibiting the use of non-certificated repair stations, the FAA
will force all United States air carriers into using only certifi-
cated repair stations as the less expensive alternative to in-house
maintenance facilities. Outsourced maintenance will be con-
tained within one sector of the aviation industry and will be per-
formed pursuant to the stricter safety standards within that
sector. With its gradual movement toward efficient electronic
oversight and its newly proposed amendments to Title 14 Part
145, the FAA has prepared itself to begin effectively managing
196 MEAD, supra note 6, at 2-4, 24.
197 Carlisle, supra note 77, at 741.
19s DOBBS, supra note 1, at i.
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even a larger number of air carriers. 9 Thus, it will no longer
be sufficient for oversight of critical maintenance to consist of
nothing more than the mere formality of signing off on the fin-
ished product. Rather, critical maintenance tasks will assuredly
be performed by certificated repair stations where safety over-
sight is a constant factor at every stage of the maintenance being
performed. While this would undoubtedly force airlines to in-
cur additional maintenance costs by eliminating the cheapest
source of maintenance labor, non-certificated facilities must not
be able to perform maintenance in such a way that sacrifices
safety. As the agency responsible for ensuring aviation safety, it
is the FAA's duty to exterminate any safety hazard which it can-
not effectively monitor.
The practice of outsourcing should not be banned altogether
because for years it has provided the aviation industry with a way
to cut costs in times of need. When an industry endures such a
severe financial blow as has been weathered by the United
States' aviation industry in the past decade, its survival is contin-
gent on finding ways to decrease the cost of operations. Moreo-
ver, there are airlines in the United States that successfully
outsource maintenance without compromising the safety of the
airborne component of the American public. Nonetheless,
there are some airlines that are cutting costs and cutting cor-
ners. It is crucial that the FAA recognize that airlines are sacri-
ficing safety for low cost labor and have done so to the
detriment of aircraft passengers, pilots, and even bystanders on
the ground. This ranking of priorities is a reprehensible exam-
ple of social irresponsibility and the FAA is equally irresponsible
if it does not ensure that aviation safety is the number one prior-
ity of all United States air carriers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Outsourcing is a method used by industries to reduce operat-
ing costs. In the past ten to fifteen years, the aviation industry in
particular has gravitated toward maintenance outsourcing as an
effective way to save money and counteract the grave financial
distress which it has suffered as a result of unfortunate social
and economic events. 20 0 However, the industry's focus on cut-
199 See An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17; see generally Depart-
ment of Transportation and Repair Stations, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,254 (Dec. 1, 2006)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 145).
200 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1.
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ting costs has eclipsed its commitment to safety. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that airlines are outsourcing more maintenance
than ever before, the Federal Aviation Administration's over-
sight of certificated repair stations is at best inadequate, and in
the case of non-certificated repair stations, oversight is non-exis-
tent. Even more disturbing is that the FAA cannot assume re-
sponsibility for the oversight of non-certificated repair stations
and yet its very recently proposed amendments to Chapter 14
Section 145 of the Code of Federal Regulations would continue
to permit non-certificated repair stations to perform mainte-
nance on United States aircraft.2 ° 1
It is necessary that the FAA be given the chance to properly
do its job of overseeing safety of the United States' aviation in-
dustry. As proven in the Department of Transportation's investi-
gations and the FAA's own admissions, the FAA currently
struggles to effectively oversee certificated repair stations.
20 2 If
the FAA is forced to spread its already rapidly-thinning inspec-
tion resources to also monitor non-certificated repair stations,
the safety of the entire aviation industry will suffer. Therefore,
in order to improve the maintenance being performed on
United States aircrafts, the FAA must require that all outsourced
maintenance be performed by certificated repair stations only.
By implementing this mandate, the FAA will ensure that all out-
sourced maintenance is being performed pursuant to FAA stan-
dards. The FAA's electronic surveillance system will keep record
of every airline that outsources maintenance, what kind of main-
tenance repair stations are doing, and whether the maintenance
is being performed in accordance with the regulations set forth
by the FAA.211 While the airlines may not retain the cheapest
labor available through non-certificated repair stations, they will
still be able to retain cheaper maintenance labor than that per-
formed at their in-house facilities. Airlines continue to cut costs,
but there is no more cutting corners.
201 See 71 Fed. Reg. at 70,254.
202 See generally DOBBS, supra note 1; STEFANI, supra note 2.
203 An Accident Waiting to Happen, supra note 1, at 17.
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